


# Machine Learning for Network Security: a few Applications

Pierre-François Gimenez  
Inria researcher  
PIRAT research team

Winter School – CyberSchool  
February 12th, 2026





# Who am I?


## Background

- PhD on machine learning at IRIT, Toulouse
- Researcher in a security team at Inria, Rennes
- I publish in both AI and security conferences, with a focus on ML for defensive cybersecurity

## ML $\cap$ Cybersecurity = ?

There are many applications of ML to cybersecurity!

- Side channel analysis
- Malware analysis
- Network intrusion detection
- Security data generation



# Who am I?

## Background

- PhD on machine learning at IRIT, Toulouse
- Researcher in a security team at Inria, Rennes
- I publish in both AI and security conferences, with a focus on ML for defensive cybersecurity

## ML $\cap$ Cybersecurity = ?

There are many applications of ML to cybersecurity!

- Side channel analysis
- Malware analysis
- **Network intrusion detection**
- **Security data generation**



# Introduction

## Systems are under attack

- Many untargeted, opportunistic attacks like password bruteforce
- Some targeted attacks with a huge power (e.g., DDoS attacks)
- Some very sophisticated attacks months or years in the making (SolarWinds, Stuxnet...)

## Cloudflare defenses autonomously block a 7.3 Tbps DDoS attack



In May 2025, an attack delivered 37.4 terabytes in 45 seconds



# Information system security

## Information system security

- Prevent the attack, detect it, and react
- Detection with **IDS**: *Intrusion Detection System*

```
2024-05-06T23:24:16.806598+02:00
stellar-sheep sshd[16039]: Failed
password for pfg from 192.168.1.36
port 48650 ssh2
```


## Detection relies on observation

- **System**: OS and applications logs
- **Network**: network communications

```
"ts": 1591367999.305988,
"id.orig_h": "192.168.4.76",
"id.resp_h": "192.168.4.1",
"id.resp_p": 53, "proto": "udp",
"service": "dns", "duration":
0.066851, "orig_bytes": 62,
"resp_bytes": 141, "conn_state":
"SF", "orig_pkts": 2,
"orig_ip_bytes": 118, "resp_pkts":
2, "resp_ip_bytes": 197
```

## Constraints

- Partial and heterogeneous observations
- Adversarial context: the attacker hides!



# Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection
- 3 Explainable AI for Anomaly Detection
- 4 ML for synthetic data generation
- 5 Conclusion



# Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection



# Two categories of detectors

## Signature-based detection

**Date:** 2024-04-25 10:24:52+02:00  
**Source IP:** 194.57.169.1  
**Destination IP:** 128.93.162.83



**Signature :** alert udp any any -> any 123 (content:"|00 02 2A|";  
offset:1; depth:3; byte\_test:1,!&,128,0; byte\_test:1,&,4,0; byte\_test:1,&,2,0;  
byte\_test:1,&,1,0; threshold: type both, track by\_dst,count 2, seconds 60);

**Potential attack using NTP!**

### Signatures database

- + quick, clear
- regular updates, only documented attacks

## Anomaly detection

**Date:** 2024-04-25 10:24:52+02:00  
**Source IP:** 194.57.169.1  
**Destination IP:** 128.93.162.83



**Anomaly score: 7,6**

### Normal behavior model (generally with ML)

- + can detect undocumented attacks
- false positives, no alert description



# Two categories of detectors

## Signature-based detection

**Date:** 2024-04-25 10:24:52+02:00  
**Source IP:** 194.57.169.1  
**Destination IP:** 128.93.162.83



**Signature :** alert udp any any -> any 123 (content:"|00 02 2A|";  
offset:1; depth:3; byte\_test:1,!&,128,0; byte\_test:1,&,4,0; byte\_test:1,&,2,0;  
byte\_test:1,&,1,0; threshold: type both, track by\_dst,count 2, seconds 60);

**Potential attack using NTP!**

### Signatures database

- + quick, clear
- regular updates, only documented attacks

## Anomaly detection

**Date:** 2024-04-25 10:24:52+02:00  
**Source IP:** 194.57.169.1  
**Destination IP:** 128.93.162.83



**Anomaly score: 7,6**

### Normal behavior model (generally with ML)


- + can detect undocumented attacks
- false positives, no alert description



# Overview of our approach Sec2graph


## Structure of our approach

- Probes capture the network data
- These data are merged into a graph structure
- The graph is transformed into a format usable with a deep learning model
- The model affects an anomaly score to each data point





# Anomaly detection: Autoencoder (AE)



## Autoencoder

An autoencoder is a deep learning architecture with a bow-tie shape

## Learning

Minimisation of the reconstruction error between the input vector and its reconstructed version

## Detection


Raise an alert when the reconstruction error is above a threshold



# Performances on CIC-IDS2017


## Performances

Recall is mostly good but we have a very high false positive (22%) on Thursday





# Explainable AI for Anomaly Detection



# How to explain the predictions?

## The issue


- Explanations could help us understand the false positives
- There exists a lot of explanation techniques... (LIME, salient maps, counterfactual explanation...)
- ...but little work on explanations for unsupervised learning!

## First, naive approach

- We can compute the contribution of each feature to the global reconstruction error
- However, we found out this idea does not produce satisfactory explanations:
  - Some features are always difficult to reconstruct because of their high variance
  - Some features are always very faithfully reconstructed, and even a small reconstruction error may reveal an anomaly




# What it looks like





# Limitations

Comparison of the reconstruction errors of two dimensions




## Key Idea

The highest reconstruction error is not always an indication of the most abnormal dimension.

## Our approach

This area is called the p-value:

$$p_i = \frac{\#\{r_i \geq e_i\}}{\#\{r_i\}}$$




# Experimental protocol

## Protocol

- Inject noise in a known network characteristic of vectors
- Assess ability of XAI methods to find the noisy network characteristic


Experiment with AE-abs (intuitive method), SHAP\_AE (state of the art), AE-pvalues (our method)

## Example of noise insertion in the protocol characteristic






# Benchmark results



## Top-K accuracy

Proportion of samples for which the right explanation is among the Top-K explanations. But sometimes several explanations are correct...




## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing



## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing




## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing




## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing




## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing




## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing



## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$

Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing



## Several correct explanations

$$1 + 1 = 0$$


Where is the error?

We can all agree there is an error. But where do you think it is?

- 0 should be 2
- + should be -
- 1 should be -1
- = should be >
- "(mod 2)" is missing
- "is false" is missing



# Benchmark results





## A more realistic evaluation

Evaluation modification: accepting correlated features as correct explanations



## Remember that?...





## What is the issue with CIC-IDS2017?

### Not only one...


- Labeling issue: CIC-IDS2017 has a scan attack on Thursday that is not corrected labeled. About 70,000 flows of scan are labeled as "benign"!
- Duplication issue: probably due to a badly configured probe, on average 500,000 packets are duplicated per day. It caused the CSV files to contain bad data
- Shortcut learning possible: the tools use their default user agent
- And a few minors issues

Corrected CIC-IDS2017 files: <https://gitlab.inria.fr/mlanvin/crisis2022>


These results make us confident in the usefulness of our explanation method




# Updated results on CIC-IDS2017



Before CIC-IDS2017 correction



After CIC-IDS2017 correction



# Alternatives to public dataset

## Real data

- Difficult to obtain/share due to confidentiality and privacy reasons
- Typically not labeled

## Testbeds

- Difficult to create: it must include fake users with online activity with a wide range of behaviors
- Slow: we need one month to generate one month of data

## Data generation with AI

- Could be much faster than testbed
- Is AI mature enough? How to explain the generation process and to evaluate the data?



## ML for synthetic data generation






# GenAI: diffusion models

## Diffusion models

A model trained to "denoise" data. Applied several times in a row to create images from noise.






# GenAI: LLMs

## Transformers

- A model that predicts the next token based on the previous ones. The generation focuses on the relevant tokens in the context window
- It is the base of LLMs: ChatGPT, Gemini, Mistral, Llama, etc.







# GenAI for network generation

## And in network generation?

- A quick growth of works on synthetic network traffic generation
- All previous techniques are used to generate synthetic network traffic
- However, the quality of the generated data is still low
- LLM are too slow (several seconds to generate one packet...)
- Lack of explainability makes progress slower





# GenAI for network generation

## A big limitation: dependencies within the data

- Intra-flow dependency
  - the port depends on the destination IP
  - the number of packets depends on the application protocol
- Inter-flow dependency:
  - DNS query then HTTP(S)
  - IMAP request then HTTP(S)


## Our work

We propose FlowChronicle as an explainable generation method not based on deep learning



## FlowChronicle: a novel approach

- Pattern language
  - Captures intra-flow and inter-flow dependencies
  - Summarizes data with non-redundant patterns
- Data generation
  - Produces realistic traffic respecting protocols
  - Preserves temporal dependencies
- Explainability
  - Patterns are interpretable and auditable



## What is a pattern?

Frequently occurring substructure in data

## Pattern Mining

- Define the set of possible patterns, named the "pattern language"
- Find a small set of patterns that best describes the data
- More precisely, we use the patterns to compress the data: higher the compression, better the patterns



# Pattern description

## Pattern language


Each pattern has two parts: a partially defined flow, and a Bayesian network

- **Fixed** values are defined in the partial flow
- the distribution of **Free** variables is defined in the Bayesian network
- **Reused** variables are always equal to some **Free** variable

### Partial flows

Source IP	Dest. IP	Dest. Port
$\beta_A$	8.8.8.8	53
$A$	$\beta$	80

### Bayesian Network



In reality there are more columns!




## Pattern description

### Partial flows

Source IP	Dest. IP	Dest. Port
$\beta_A$	8.8.8.8	53
A	$\beta$	80


### Bayesian Network



### Example

- Here, there are two flows
- The first flow is contacting 8.8.8.8 on port 53 (DNS). The source IP is random
- The second flow has the same source IP as the first flow, and is contacting a destination IP that is random and depends on the first source IP, on port 80 (HTTP)

Our goal is to learn ("mine") such patterns



# Pattern mining algorithm

## Pattern Search:

- 1 Initialize Model with an empty pattern
- 2 Generate Pattern Candidates from existing patterns  $p \in M$ .
  - By extending with an attribute
  - By merging existing patterns
- 3 Test candidates for addition:
  - Cover the datasets with the patterns
  - Add patterns when it reduces MDL score:  $L(D | M) + L(M)$



## Loss function

Length of data given the model:

$$L(D | M) = \sum_{p \in M} (L_{\mathbb{N}}(|W_p|) + L(W_p))$$

where:

$$L(W_p) = \sum_{i=1}^{|W_p|} \left( L(t_1 \text{ of } w_i) + \sum_{k=2}^{|p|} L(t_k \text{ of } w_i | t_{i-1}) \right) - \log(\text{Pr}(w_i | BN_p, \{w_j | j < i\}))$$

Length of Model:

$$L(M) = L_{\mathbb{N}}(|M|) + \sum_{p \in M} L(p)$$

Length of one pattern:

$$L(p) = L_{\mathbb{N}}(|p|) + \left( \sum_{j=1}^{|p|} L(X[j] | p) \right) + L(BN_p)$$




## FlowChronicle: generation quality

	Density	CMD	PCD	EMD	JSD	Coverage	DKC	MD	Rank
	<i>Real.</i> ↑	<i>Real.</i> ↓	<i>Real.</i> ↓	<i>Real./Div.</i> ↓	<i>Real./Div.</i> ↓	<i>Div.</i> ↑	<i>Comp.</i> ↓	<i>Nov.</i> =	<i>Average Ranking</i>
Reference	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>6.71</b>	-
IndependentBN	0.24	0.22	2.74	<i>0.11</i>	0.27	0.38	0.05	5.47	5.25
SequenceBN	0.30	<b>0.13</b>	2.18	0.08	0.21	0.44	<b>0.02</b>	5.51	3.875
TVAE	0.49	0.18	1.84	<b>0.01</b>	0.30	0.33	0.07	5.17	4.125
CTGAN	<b>0.56</b>	0.15	<b>1.60</b>	0.01	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<i>0.11</i>	<b>5.70</b>	<b>3.0</b>
E-WGAN-GP	<i>0.02</i>	0.34	<i>3.63</i>	0.02	0.38	<i>0.02</i>	0.07	4.66	7.0
NetShare	0.32	0.28	<b>1.47</b>	0.03	0.36	0.22	0.05	3.82	5.25
Transformer	<b>0.62</b>	<i>0.78</i>	3.62	<b>0.00</b>	<i>0.55</i>	0.03	0.05	<i>3.75</i>	<i>5.375</i>
FlowChronicle	0.41	<b>0.03</b>	2.06	0.02	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>5.87</b>	<b>2.125</b>



## FlowChronicle: temporal generation quality



Overall, FlowChronicle outperforms other GenAI techniques and is explainable



## Conclusion



## Conclusion

ML + Cybersecurity = ♡

- There are many applications of ML to cybersecurity
- I presented three of them:
  - Network intrusion detection
  - Explainable AI for anomaly detection
  - Synthetic network traffic generation

### Current limits of ML

- ML is not a silver bullet for cybersecurity (yet)
- ML-based IDS still raise too many false positives
- Lack of explainability is a big drawback
- LLM-based AI is not scalable enough for intrusion detection but can help analyst to investigate alerts